Bad News For Leveraged Partnerships
Leveraged partnerships have been one of the few remaining techniques to dispose of unwanted businesses. A recent Tax Court decision has raised questions about the continued viability of this technique. Even more disturbing is the court’s view of the role of opinions in corporate business transactions.
The tax law often looks to the economic substance of a transaction—rather than its form—to determine its proper tax treatment. Thus, if a taxpayer transfers appreciated property to a partnership and receives back cash from the partnership, the law treats the transaction as a “disguised sale.” The regulations provide an exception to this result, however, where the cash is a distribution of partnership debt; in that case, the partner would recognize gain only to the extent that the amount distributed exceeds the partner’s basis in its partnership interest.
Taxpayers have used this exception to defer (but not eliminate) gain. For example, A and B form a partnership, with A contributing appreciated assets and B contributing a small amount of cash. The partnership then borrows money from a bank and A guarantees the debt in some way. A’s guaranty causes the basis in A;s partnership interest to increase by the amount of the debt guarantee. The partnership then distributes the borrowed cash to A some or all of which is tax free. A would generally recognize the deferred gain no later than when A exits the partnership. Clearly, the difficulty in these cases is to effectively allocate the debt to A’s tax basis while minimizing the impact on A’s balance sheet.
In Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 9 (Aug. 5, 2010), the taxpayer, Chesapeake Corporation (“C”), used a leveraged partnership structure to transfer control of its tissue paper subsidiary, WISCO, to Georgia-Pacific (“G-P”). The partnership borrowed $755 million from Bank of America and distributed the proceeds to C. G-P guaranteed the debt, but WISCO agreed to indemnify G-P for any principal payment G-P might have to make under its guaranty. C believed that the indemnity was sufficient to allocate the debt to C, thereby making the cash distribution tax free.
The Tax Court disagreed, relying on an anti-abuse rule that disregards a partner’s obligation to make a payment if the facts and circumstances (1) indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement is to eliminate the partner’s risk of loss or to create a façade of the partner’s bearing the economic risk of loss, or (2) evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. The court disregarded the indemnity because (1) G-P did not require the indemnity; (2) WISCO, not C, was the indemnitor; (3) WISCO was not required to maintain sufficient net worth to pay the indemnity; (4) the indemnity covered only the loan’s principal, not interest; and (5) G-P was required to proceed first against the partnership’s assets before demanding indemnification. These factors convinced the court that the indemnity was designed to avoid WISCO’s payment of the obligation.
While increasing the risk of leveraged partnerships significantly, this decision may be viewed more as a result of poor planning and structuring than a categorical rejection of the technique. A more disturbing element of the case, however, is the Tax Court’s imposition of a penalty even though C had obtained a “should” opinion on the transaction from PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”).
The court concluded that C’s reliance on the opinion was unreasonable for several reasons:
• The opinion entered into evidence by C was a “draft”, not a final opinion;
• The draft opinion was “littered with typographical error, disorganized and incomplete”;
• C paid PwC a flat fee for the opinion so PwC was paid the same amount regardless of how much time was spent on it;
• The opinion was “riddled with questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions”; and
• PwC issued a “should” opinion even though no authority on point existed.
Most disturbingly, the court believed that C did not act with good faith in relying on PwC’s opinion because PwC had an “inherent conflict of interest” as C’s auditor and as the advisor that structured the transaction “without the normal give-an-take in negotiating terms with an outside party.”
Does this case mean that a taxpayer should never rely on an opinion prepared by an advisor that planned the transaction? Such a conclusion may be going too far, given the unusual facts surrounding PwC’s opinion in this case. Nevertheless, after Canal Corp., prudence might dictate that taxpayers should ensure that they receive opinions from disinterested objective advisers whenever possible.
This document was not intended or written to be used, and it cannot be used, for the purpose of avoiding U.S. federal, state, or local tax penalties.




